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Abstract Different nutrient abatement activities jointly determine water quality. Policies
are determined by governments at central and local level, implying that decisions can be
affected by strategic considerations. In this article, decentralization of wetland policies is
analyzed with regard to the environmental and economic consequences. A two-stage game
is used to investigate strategic abatement decisions regarding nitrogen fertilizer reductions,
waste water treatment plant phosphorus reductions and wetlands, assuming that wetland
decision can be decentralized. It is shown that under particular circumstances, strategic con-
sideration may imply that a central government undertakes more abatement than socially
optimal, but in most cases the opposite is likely to occur. Decentralization of wetland deci-
sions is advantageous to the central government but only benefits the local government if
its wetland technology is considerably more efficient that the central government’s. This
paper explains why local governments often hesitate to take on additional responsibilities for
environmental management, and identifies conditions under which local governments make
smaller losses or even gain from delegation. The results also contribute to understanding how
strategically optimal matching grants are chosen when governments only take into account
their own direct costs of abatement and the central government needs to satisfy the local
government’s participation constraint.
Keywords Hierarchical governance · Nitrogen · Phosphorus · Stackelberg ·
Water Framework Directive · Wetlands
1 Introduction
Water quality policies are determined and implemented by multiple governments in
different sectors and at different levels (see e.g. Lundqvist 2004). The multitude of
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governments involved leads to difficulties in coordinating policies to achieve cost-effec-
tiveness, and decision-makers may act strategically to pursue their own interests.
Implementation of the EU’s new Water Framework Directive (WFD) should, in principle,
lead to a strengthening of the regional governmental level for water management (EC 2007).
The WFD requires all EU countries to assign River Basin Districts1 and associated Compe-
tent Authorities. The Competent Authorities are responsible for compilation of environmental
and economic information, and development of environmental quality targets and river basin
management plans. If the river basin management plans are to be enforced, the rights and
responsibilities of the Competent Authorities and those of local and national governments
might need to be adjusted, particularly in regard to the right to decide on policy instruments
(CA 2007). This brings to the fore the need for analysis of hierarchical governance structures
with regard to environmental management. Currently, responsibilities for water quality man-
agement are split between national and local governments. Decisions on policy instruments
for the agricultural sector are, to a large extent, made by central governments within the
context of the CAP-financed Rural Development Programs. Local governments generally
have the decision-right on wastewater management and spatial planning, both of which are
important for water quality management.
There is so far little evidence that policy discretion has actually been delegated within the
WFD context. On the contrary, there is a tendency for damping the independence of local
governments with regard to environmental policy in general, while instead increasing—on
voluntary or non-voluntary basis—the delegation of centrally defined tasks to local level
(Hovik 2004). These tasks are to some extent reimbursed by the central level—intergovern-
mental grants to local governments, earmarked for environmental purposes, constitute up
to 40% of all earmarked grants in the OECD countries (Bergvall et al. 2006). Such grants
could provide local governments with incentives to increase abatement to the socially optimal
level in the case of interregional spillovers, or lead to the achievement of optimal outcomes
if neither central nor local governments strive to maximize social net benefits (Miceli and
Segerson 1999).
The relative merits of centralized and decentralized environmental policy are extensively
analyzed in the literature. It has been argued that in the presence of inter-jurisdictional tax
competition, local governments have incentives to set environmental standards below the
optimal level (Rauscher 1995; Porter 1999), a view that has been questioned on both empir-
ical and theoretical grounds (Wheeler 2001; Millimet 2003; Roelfsema 2007). In principle,
the right to decide on policy goals should be assigned to the lowest governmental level that
takes into account all costs and benefits of the policy in question (Oates and Schwab 1996;
Oates 1998; Wellisch 2000). In practice, this distinction is not always easily made; for exam-
ple, when a single abatement activity may jointly reduce local, regional and global pollutants
(Caplan and Silva 2005). In addition, local and national governments can have different infor-
mation about the benefits and costs of policies such that it would be beneficial to society to
pool information from both (Andersen and Jensen 2003). The interaction between central and
local governments can be an important determinant of both the decision to decentralize and
the outcome of decentralization (Pierre and Peters 2000; Andersen and Jensen 2003; Demski
and Sappinton 1987; Miceli and Segerson 1999). Moreover, the impact of decentralization
may vary with institutional and economic conditions (Wälti 2004).
This article is based on the following observations: (i) the local government may have a
cost advantage with regard to the provision of environmental benefits (d’Amato and Valentini
2008);
1 This requirement has led to the establishment of 110 River Basin Districts across the EU27 (EC 2007).
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(ii) different abatement activities can jointly determine environmental quality; (iii) inter-
action between central and local governments can affect the environmental and economic
outcome of decentralization; and (iv) there can be institutional constraints on delegation of
policy discretion.
In this paper, the particular local cost advantage with regard to wetland construction is
defined and its implications are discussed in a context where, unlike in d’Amato and Valentini
(2008), interactions between governmental levels are taken into account. The model devel-
oped here highlights the trade-off between the benefits of technological advantages associated
with delegation on one hand, and effects of strategic decision-making on the other. Incentives
for decentralization with and without intergovernmental matching grants for local abatement
are investigated. The analysis is carried out with the help of a two-stage game-theoretic
model. Given the complexity that arises in sequential games, numerical simulations based on
reasonable data are carried out to analyze the outcome. The paper adds to existing literature
on hierarchical management through the inclusion of technology interdependence between
abatement measures in combination with constraints to delegation.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model, Sect. 3
describes the socially optimal solution and Sect. 4 describes the sequential games. Section 5
describes the data for the simulations, and the results are given in Sect. 6. Section 7 provides
a discussion on the results.
2 The Model
In the following a two-stage model is developed to illustrate the interdependences between
central and local decisions with regard to water quality management. It is assumed that there
are two different governments i = C, L , where C denotes the central and L the local govern-
ment. The central government can be thought of as the national government. Assuming zero
interregional spillovers between local jurisdictions, the local government can be thought of
as the aggregate of all local governments in a country.2 Each of the two governments aims
to maximize net benefits, given their perceptions of benefits and costs of abatement, which
are explained in the following.
There are two pollutants; nitrogen and phosphorus, which contribute to impaired water
quality. Reductions in nutrients to the coastal zone are denoted Rn , with n = N , P , where
N and P denote nitrogen and phosphorus, respectively. Central and local governments both
benefit from reduced nutrient emissions to coastal waters. They are assumed to have identical
linear benefit functions B (Rn) = ∑n bn Rn , where bn is the marginal benefit of reductions
in nutrient n. Identical benefit functions is a reasonable assumption when the local level
is an aggregate of all local governments. In general, benefits of nitrogen and phosphorus
reductions are likely to be non-separable because eutrophication is jointly determined by the
inputs of the two nutrients. However, the nature of the interdependences between nitrogen
and phosphorus cannot be modeled in a general manner and often, it is not possible to deter-
mine interdependences even for a specific aquifer. Therefore, much of the scientific literature
assumes separability between the two nutrients with regard to eutrophication (see e.g. Nielsen
et al. 2002; Håkanson et al. 2007). Where the characteristics of interdependence can be iden-
tified, it is evident that the relationship is site-specific, complex, and nonsymmetric between
the two nutrients (Håkanson et al. 2007; Wulff et al. 2007). The choice of nonseparability in
2 In principle, the model could also be applied when the local government is one out of multiple local gov-
ernments, as long as there are no externalities between the local governments. This would only require an
appropriate scaling of the local government’s benefit and cost functions.
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this paper is explained by convenience of modeling in combination with the lack of general
interdependences.
It is assumed that there are three different abatement measures, x1, x2 and x3, that can
be used to reduce nutrient emissions to coastal waters. Of those, x1 is reduction of nitrogen
fertilizers, x2 is the area of constructed wetlands and x3 is reduction of phosphorus emis-
sions from wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs). These three measures are chosen because
they are among the most important available options in a cost-effective policy with regard
to combating nutrient loads to the Baltic Sea (Elofsson 2010a). The central government is
assumed always to have the right to determine the level of fertilizer use. This assumption
is motivated by the dominating role of central governments with regard to agricultural and
agri-environmental policy in most countries. It is assumed that the right to decide on wetlands
could be given to either the central or local government. This assumption seems reasonable
considering the current split of decision-rights between central and local governments with
regard to land use management. The local government is assumed to make decisions about
the level of phosphorus abatement at WWTPs. Finally, the central government is assumed to
decide on the level of matching grants for abatement at the local level.
There are costs associated with the abatement measures. Cost functions are assumed to
be increasing and convex and each governmental level is assumed to take into account only
the costs associated with abatement over which it has decision-rights. It is assumed that the
cost for each measure equals the private costs to each government of undertaking the mea-
sure in question. This assumption is motivated by agricultural policy measures and municipal
wastewater treatment usually being financed by public funds.3 Ignorance with regard to costs
incurred by other governmental levels could be explained by governments making a narrow
ex-ante analysis of the consequences of their decisions, taking into account only direct costs.4
Cost functions differ depending on which level of government has the final decision rights
on wetlands. In the case where the central government has the final say on wetlands develop-
ment policy, its costs are defined by CC = a1 (x1)2 +a2
(
xC2
)2 +βa3 (x3)2, where a1, a1 and
a3 are cost coefficients for the different measures, respectively. This implies that the central
government incurs the full cost for reductions in fertilizer use and wetlands and a fraction
β, with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, of the costs for phosphorus reductions in WWTPs, where β equals the
matching grant for phosphorus reductions. If the local government decides on wetlands, the
central government’s cost function is defined by CC = a1 (x1)2 + αa2
(
x L2
)2 + βa3 (x3)2,
where α, with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, is the matching grant for wetlands. Correspondingly, the local
government’s cost function is defined by C L = (1 − β)a3 (x3)2 in the case when the central
government decides on wetlands and C L = (1 − α)a2
(
x L2
)2 + (1 − β)a3 (x3)2 when the
local government decides on wetlands.
3 The assumption seems reasonable as under the Rural Development Programs, countries are only allowed to
compensate farmers for the direct costs incurred. For wetlands, this includes compensation for the opportunity
cost of land. We note that several European countries, e.g. Sweden, Norway, Finland and Austria, have earlier
controlled nitrogen fertilizer use through the use of environmental taxes, see e.g. Söderholm and Christiernsson
(2008). In all cases, the tax has been revoked, suggesting that the “polluter pays” principle is not accepted for
abatement in the agricultural sector.
4 It is not difficult to find examples that show governments have a simplified view on the costs associated with
abatement measures. For example, in a Swedish evaluation of the nitrogen fertilizer tax, cost estimates are
based on a static evaluation of the farmer’s costs without recognition of production adjustment possibilities,
indirect costs imposed on other sectors, or indirect effects on other abatement measures (MOF 2003). For the
Swedish rural development program (MOA 2008), the flat-rate level of agri-environmental support to nutrient
reducing measures is calculated on the basis of private cost to an “average” Swedish farm, ignoring cost
variation among farmers and production adjustment possibilities.
123
Delegation of Decision-Rights for Wetlands 289
Reductions of nitrogen and phosphorus loads to coastal waters due to reductions in nitro-
gen fertilizers and phosphorus reductions at WWTPs are defined by rN D x1 and rP D x3,
respectively, where rnD , with 0 ≤ rnD ≤ 1 equals one minus retention of nutrient n on the
way from the sources through the drainage basin to the coastal area.5 Thus, rnD expresses
the impact of a unit reduction of nutrient n on coastal load.
Wetlands are known to serve as sinks for nitrogen and phosphorus, and nutrient abate-
ment in wetlands, measured in absolute terms, is increasing in the nutrient load reaching
the wetland (Correll et al. 1992; Jansson et al. 1994; Svensson et al. 2004). Empirical evi-
dence suggests that nutrient removal is lower in wetlands created with centrally rather than
locally administered abatement policies. In an evaluation initiated by the Swedish Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (SEPA), wetlands constructed with the support of the cen-
trally administered CAP-financed agri-environmental program were compared with those
created under the so called Local Investment Programs (LIP), where municipalities chose
the design and location of the wetlands (Svensson et al. 2004). Agri-environmental support
is distributed to farmers through the national Board of Agriculture, and general rules gov-
ern the eligibility for and level of support, not including any requirements for the location
of the wetland apart from being located on agricultural land. Municipalities were eligi-
ble to apply for LIP-support from the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA)
between 1998 and 2008. These applications include a plan for the location of the wet-
lands, and wetlands could be located also on non-agricultural land. The SEPA evaluation
revealed that wetlands constructed with LIP-support abated considerably more nutrients
per hectare than those constructed with CAP-support. This is explained by the LIP-wet-
lands being located such that their drainage area is larger and hence a large nutrient load
reaches the wetland.6 This comes at a slightly higher cost. Differences in nutrient abate-
ment seem to be explained by differences in policy instrument design, where the design
of wetlands plays a minor role for the granting of the nationally administered CAP-sup-
port to farmers and a larger role for the granting of LIP-support to local municipalities
(Svensson et al. 2004). Moreover, the local government has superior knowledge about the
local landscape, implying that it is able to identify better locations for wetlands than the
central government is. Therefore, it is here assumed that wetlands constructed by the local
government abate more nutrients than those constructed by the central government because
they capture a larger fraction of the total load of nutrients, i.e. they have a larger drainage
area.
Nutrient abatement in coastal wetlands is then defined as xi2kinrnW
(
L0n − rnD x1
)
, where kin
is the fraction of the load of nutrient n entering one hectare of wetland, rnW , with 0 ≤ rnW ≤ 1,
is the retention of nutrient n in wetlands, measured in percent, and L0n is the initial load of
nutrient n reaching the coastal region. Thus, it is assumed here that wetlands remove a con-
stant fraction of the nutrients entering the wetland and that nutrient abatement is higher when
the local government chooses the design, because each unit of wetland captures a larger frac-
tion of the nutrient load, i.e. kLn > kCn . It is assumed that wetlands can be constructed only
in the coastal zone and once nutrients have passed the wetland, they directly enter coastal
waters.
5 Nutrient retention is a process where a fraction of the nutrients emitted from the sources are captured in
soils, sediments and vegetation.
6 Notably, wetlands are valuable not only because of their nutrient sink capacity but also because of their
contribution to biodiversity. The SEPA report shows there is larger stated focus on nutrient reductions for
wetlands constructed with LIP-support compared with those constructed with CAP-support, but there is no
evidence that either type performs better with regard to biodiversity.
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L0N − rN D x1





L0P − rP D x3
)+rP D x3 for
nitrogen and phosphorus, respectively. These functions are increasing, concave and non-sep-
arable. Nitrogen reductions depend jointly on x1 and xi2, and phosphorus reductions dependjointly on xi2 and x3.
The central and local governments are assumed to take their decisions sequentially with
the central government making the first move. The assumption about the central government
being the first mover is often made in models where vertical interaction between governments
is investigated (cf. e.g. Andersson et al. 2004; Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé 2001; Fenge and
Wrede 2004). Sequential decisions are a reasonable assumption if, for example, the central
government is able to inform the local government about its decisions, while many small,
local governments can have difficulties coordinating information. Also, many small govern-
ments might not be able to collude and challenge the central government, implying that the
central government has market power that facilitates a commitment (cf. Boadway and Keen
1996). In the following, the socially optimal solution is first derived as a reference case. This
is followed by a comparison of the sequential games where, in turn, the central and local
governments have the overriding decision-right over wetlands.
3 The Socially Optimal Solution
Before turning to the above-described strategic problem, the socially optimal solution is
first derived as a reference case. The social problem is one of maximizing total net benefits,
TNB, of abatement, and the social optimum is one where the local government’s superior
knowledge about wetland technology is utilized:
max
x1,x2,x3














− a11 (x1)2 − a2
(
xi2
)2 − a3 (x3)2 (1)
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions (FOCs) are:
bN
[






) + bP kLPrPW
(
L0P − rPDx3






The FOCs require that marginal benefits are equated to marginal costs. The marginal benefit
of x1 and x3 is determined by the direct impact of nitrogen fertilizer and WWTP phosphorus
reductions, respectively, on coastal load minus the negative impact on wetland nutrient abate-
ment, see Eqs. (2) and (4). Thus, the optimal level of abatement of fertilizers and wastewater
emissions is smaller than if the impact on wetland abatement was ignored. Equation (3)
requires that marginal benefits of wetland construction are equal to marginal costs, given that
marginal benefits are determined by the load of nutrients reaching the wetland.
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4 The Sequential Game
If, instead, there are two different governmental levels and governments only take their own
costs into account, this will affect abatement choices. A sequential game where the central
government decides on wetlands is first analyzed in Sect. 4.1, followed by one where the
local government has the decision-right in Sect. 4.2.
4.1 The Central Government has the Decision-Right on Wetlands
Assume that the central government has the decision right on x1, x2 and β, and that decisions
are taken sequentially, implying that the central government will internalize the reaction of
the local government. Solving the game by backwards induction, we first look at the local
government’s decision problem, which is as follows:
max
x3
TNBL = BL (Rn) − C L = bN
[
x L2 kLN rN W
(
L0N − rN D x1






L0P − rP D x3
) + rP D x3
]
− (1 − α) a2
(
x L2
)2 − (1 − β) a3 (x3)2 (5)
The FOC for x3 is determined by:
bP
[
−x L2 kLPrPW rP D + rP D
]
= 2 (1 − β) a3x3. (6)




, given by Eq. (6), now enters the
central government’s decision-problem, where the central government strives to maximize
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L0P − rP D x R3
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+ rP D x R3
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TNBL ≥ TNBL ,
where TNBL is the level of minimum net benefits required by the local government. The size
of TNBL could, for example, reflect the bargaining power of the local government. If the
bargaining power is low, TNBL is small, and if the bargaining power is high, TNBL is large.
Assuming an interior solution, the FOC for x1 is:
bN
[
−x2kLN rN W rN D + rN D
]






where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier with regard to the participation constraint. The FOC for
xC2 is:
bN kCN rN W
(






L0P − rP D x R3
)
− xC2 kCP rPW rP D
∂x R3
∂xC2












The FOC for β is:
bP
[










It is assumed that the problem is convex and that there is a unique point
(




As indicated by Eq. (9), the central government’s choice of x2 is affected in several ways by
the introduction of strategic decision-making compared with the socially optimal outcome. It




= − bP kCP rPW rP D2(1−β)a3 ≤ 0.
The central government anticipates that the local government will compensate for a higher x2
through a decrease in x3. Looking at the simplified case where kCP = kLP , it can be seen that the
central government’s perceived marginal benefits from an increase in x2 will be lower than
the social marginal benefit due to a direct effect of strategic decision-making. This is reflected




, which is negative. However, this
will be counteracted through the technology interdependence effect, captured in the positive




, which tells us that the central government will anticipate that mar-
ginal phosphorus abatement in wetlands will increase when x3 is reduced. The direct effect




∣ < 1, which holds if wetlands
are modestly efficient in phosphorus abatement, but may not do so if wetlands are highly effi-
cient in abatement.8 Thus, if wetlands are highly efficient, sequential decision-making could
imply that a larger wetland area is created by the central government than socially optimal,9
while the opposite would occur if wetlands are less efficient. Turning to Eq. (10), it states
that the marginal change in the environmental benefits from x3 due to a marginal change in
β must equal the marginal cost of the change in β, taking into account the reaction of the
local government with regard to its choice of x3. Finally, comparing Eqs. (8)–(10), reveals
that an increase in TNBL would imply that the central government increases x1, xC2 and/or
β. Thus, either of the central government’s decision variables could be used to satisfy the
participation constraint.
7 If the problem is not convex, the FOCs are necessary but not sufficient for a global maximum. The assump-
tion about an interior solution is made to simplify the expressions, although corner solutions where one or
more of the choice variables take on either a zero or a maximum value may well occur in reality and are
allowed for in the simulations below.
8 If wetlands are highly efficient, kCP and rPW are high, implying that x2 is also high, while the opposite holds








9 At least this could be the outcome if the last term on the r.h.s., λ∂TNBL/∂xC2 , is small.
123
Delegation of Decision-Rights for Wetlands 293
4.2 The Local Government has the Final Decision-Rights on Wetlands
Next, we look at the subgame perfect outcome when the local government is given the right
to decide on x2. In this case, the local government solves the following:
max
x L2 ,x3
TNBL = BL (Rn) − C L
= bN
[
x L2 kLN rN W
(
L0N − rN D x1






L0P − rP D x3
) + rP D x3
]
− (1 − α) a2
(
x L2
)2 − (1 − β) a3 (x3)2 (11)
The reaction function for x L2 , is:
bN kLN rN W
(
L0N − rN D x1
) + bP kLPrPW
(
L0P − rP D x3
) = 2 (1 − α) a2x L2 , (12)
whereas the reaction function for x3 is still defined by Eq. (6) above.
The local government’s reaction functions, x R2 = x2 (x1, α, x3(β)), given by Eq. (12)
and x R3 = x3 (x2 (x1, α) , β), given by Eqs. (6) and (12), now enter the decision prob-
lem. The slopes of the reaction functions with regard to x1 are
∂x R2
∂x1















≥ 0. The difference in sign of the slopes is
explained by fertilizer reductions and WWTP reductions both being substitutes for wetlands.
The sign of the slope in the former case is explained by an increase in the wetland area being
substituted for a decrease in fertilizer reductions. In the latter case, the sign of the slope is
explained by an increase in the wetland area being substituted for a decrease in fertilizer
reductions, and the larger wetlands area being compensated for through a smaller WWTP

















≤ 0. That is, a higher grant tends
to increase the amount of the targeted abatement measure and reduce the level of the other
measure.
Knowing this, we can turn to the central government’s decision problem which is to:
max
x1,α,β
TNBC = B (Rn) − C
= bN
[
x R2 kLN rN W
(
L0N − rN D x1






L0P − rP D x R3
)
+ rP D x R3
]









TNBL ≥ TNBL .
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L0P − rP D x R3
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− x R2 kLPrPW rP D
∂x R3
∂x1

















Comparing this with the corresponding FOC for the socially optimal solution in Eq. (2),
there are several differences. When decisions are taken strategically, the central government
will take into account that an increase in x1 will imply that the local government reduces















L0P − rP D x R3
)
. However, the central gov-
ernment will anticipate that there will also be a secondary impact on the local government’s
choice of x3, which will increase. This is associated with an increase in the central govern-
ment’s marginal net benefit owing to the direct effect on abatement, but has the disadvantage
that the wetland phosphorus abatement will fall. The additional terms on the l.h.s., compared




, i.e. the direct effect on abatement, which is
positive. Thus, if x3 was not included in the problem, x1 would definitely be smaller under
sequential decision-making where the local government decides on wetlands. Moreover, all








only kLP . Given that kLn is a small term, we can therefore not exclude the possibility that x1
is larger under sequential decision-making than is socially optimal. This is more likely if
kLn is small. With positive matching grants, the central government saves on costs for grants
to wetlands by increasing x1 but has to spend more on grants for phosphorus reductions at
WWTPs.





































The first term on the l.h.s. in Eq. (15) is the direct impact of a larger α on benefits of wet-
land nutrient abatement. The first term within squared brackets expresses the joint effects on
wetland phosphorus abatement from changes in both x L2 and x3 due to a marginal increase
in α, while the last term expresses the direct effect on phosphorus abatement. On the right
hand side, we have the marginal change in costs when α is increased, determined by optimal
levels of x L2 and x3 and the marginal changes in those.
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The FOC for β is:
bN kLN rN W
(










L0P − rP D x R3
)






















which can be interpreted in a similar manner as for Eq. (15).
The analysis above shows that abatement carried out and the associated net benefits will
be jointly determined by the allocation of decision-rights for wetlands, the technological
interdependence between wetlands and other measures, and the choice of intergovernmen-
tal matching grants. However, the direction of the impact also depends on the difference in
wetland technologies adopted by central and local governments. Hence, the consequences of
delegation can only be judged with the help of empirical data. To analyze the implications
of delegation on abatement choices, grants and net benefits, we use simulations based on
realistic data.
5 Data
Data for the simulations for Sweden have been obtained from the literature. Benefits are
assumed to be linear in nutrient load reductions. Following Mäler (1989), marginal benefits
are derived from observed policies, assuming that policy-makers equate marginal cost and
marginal benefit. Using the model in Elofsson (2010b), the marginal costs for nitrogen and
phosphorus reductions undertaken in Sweden between 1995 and 2005 were estimated to be
33 and 101 EUR, respectively, per kilo of nutrient reaching coastal waters. This is assumed
to equal the marginal benefit of nutrient reductions.
The cost of nitrogen fertilizer reductions is the reduction in consumer surplus in the nitro-
gen fertilizer market, while the cost for wetland construction is the sum of construction costs
and compensation for the opportunity costs for land. Costs for WWTP phosphorus reductions
are the costs of increasing abatement capacity in WWTPs. For all measures, quadratic cost
functions are calculated from data in Gren et al. (2008). On the basis of data in Svensson et
al. (2004), local government wetland construction costs are assumed to be 2.6 times higher
than those of the central government.10
The impact of nitrogen fertilizer reductions on coastal loads is determined by nutrient
root zone leaching and retention of nutrients in inland waters. The impact of a reduction
of phosphorus loads from WWTPs is determined by phosphorus retention in inland waters.
The parameter rnD is calculated based on information on these data in Gren et al. (2008).
Wetlands reduce both nitrogen and phosphorus loads. The parameters kir and rnW are calcu-
lated from data in Svensson et al. (2004), while assuming that parameters associated with
wetlands constructed with the help of agri-environmental (CAP) support are relevant for the
central government, while parameters for LIP wetlands are relevant for the local government.
Given this assumption, data suggest that locally designed wetlands capture on average 18
times more nitrogen and 11 times more phosphorus than centrally designed wetlands. Initial
10 This cost difference is not explicitly incorporated in the theoretical model above because it is of limited
theoretical interest, but is included in the simulations because of its empirical relevance.
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loads from nitrogen fertilizers and WWTP plants have been calculated using data from Statis-
tics Sweden, and it is assumed that those are the only nutrient emission sources. It is assumed
that net loads must be nonnegative.
6 Results
Using the above-described data, the implications of delegation are simulated using a GAMS
(Rosenthal 2008) programming model. For the calculations, multiple runs are made with
different initial values to control for the possibility of multiple local optima.
First, the outcome under a hypothetical, single decision-maker is calculated. This is fol-
lowed by calculation of the outcome of a sequential game according to default parameter
values and zero matching grants. The game with default parameter values is then compared
with the outcome when governments are identical with regard to costs and wetland effi-
ciency, thereby isolating the “pure” effect of strategic decision-making. These calculations
show that results are highly sensitive to assumptions about the difference in wetland abate-
ment performance between central and local governments and therefore, sensitivity analysis
is carried out with regard to this difference. Finally, the possibility of applying a strategically
optimal grant is introduced, and the sensitivity of the optimal grants with regard to different
values of kLr and TNBL is investigated.
6.1 A Single Decision-Maker
The outcome with a single decision-maker is first calculated using default values, see the left
part of Table 1. These calculations show that if the central government makes all decisions,
all abatement measures are used, but if the local government makes all decisions there will
be a corner solution where wetland construction is the only abatement measure. The latter is
also the socially optimal outcome.
6.2 Sequential Decisions
The outcome of sequential decision-making is first investigated for the case with zero match-
ing grants. Results are shown in Table 1. The third and fourth columns in the table show results
for default parameters values. If the central government decides on wetlands this implies that
fertilizer reductions are increased, and wetland construction is reduced compared with the
socially optimal outcome. This is explained by the central government using its first-mover
advantage to make the local government increase WWTP reductions. If wetland decision
rights are delegated, this would imply that the socially optimal outcome is achieved, which
is explained by the high effectiveness of wetlands with regard to nutrient abatement com-
pared with other measures. This leads to a corner solution, where strategic behavior becomes
zero as other measures are not used. Delegation then leads to a gain in net benefits to both
governmental levels and society as a whole.
The fifth and sixth columns in Table 1 depict the outcome when governments have iden-
tical wetland effect and cost parameters, equal to the default values for the central govern-
ment. In this scenario, delegation leads to increased wetland construction and smaller fer-
tilizer reductions while WWTP reductions are unaffected, changes which are all explained
by strategic decision-making. Both government levels will lose from delegation because
of the larger strategic interaction in this game, compared with the one where the central
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N fert red., ktons 95126 102282 79661 2895 0 0
Wetl, ha 32720 9572 23677 58513 79169 98961
P red at WWTPs, 12 13 9 0 0 0
ton
C NB, MEUR 96 92 107 159 283 442
L NB, MEUR 175 168 142 82 142 211
NB to society, 96 89 94 82 142 211
MEUR
government decides on wetlands. This is explained by fertilizer and wetland decisions being
more closely interlinked than wetland and WWTP decisions. In the seventh and eighth col-
umns, the outcomes of delegation are compared when governments have identical wetland
effect and cost parameters, equal to the default values for the local government. In both
cases, the socially optimal outcome would be achieved, implying that strategic interaction is
cancelled because wetlands are highly superior in nutrient abatement.
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The results in Table 1 reveal that the large magnitude of the difference in wetland abatement
effect between local and central governments, suggested in the EPA evaluation discussed
above, leads to radically different outcomes of the strategic game, depending on who decides
on wetlands. Given the large difference in wetland abatement effects suggested by the EPA
report, sensitivity of results to the difference between kC and kL is investigated in Table 2
for the case with zero matching grants. The calculations show that the outcome is highly
sensitive to this difference. With kL = 2kC , both governments lose from delegation because
of the higher cost of locally constructed wetlands. This also results in a reduction in the area
of constructed wetlands and an increase in fertilizer reductions. With kL ≥ 4, the central
government gains from delegation because: (i) it does not have to bear costs for wetland
construction; (ii) its benefits from wetland construction are greater; and (iii) its first-mover
advantage implies that more of the abatement burden is shifted over to the local government.
The local government gains from decentralization if kL ≥ 9. Only above this level will the
gains of greater wetland abatement efficiency outweigh the disadvantage of the higher wet-
land construction costs and the local government’s strategically disadvantageous position.
Society as a whole would only gain from delegation if kL ≥ 7, a level above which the overall
strategic bias in combination with higher wetland construction costs is outweighed by higher
wetland abatement efficiency. The most disadvantageous situation for the local government
is when kL = 6. The explanation is that for this level of the parameter, WWTP reductions
are excluded from the game, wherefore the central government no longer has any incentive
to maintain high fertilizer reductions to make the local government follow with high WWTP
reductions, as discussed in the theoretical section above. Instead, the central government fully
exploits its strategic position to make the local government increase wetland construction.
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Thus, the inclusion of WWTP reductions in the game implies that the central government
must withhold some of its power to shift the abatement burden to the local government.
In Table 3, the optimal grant is calculated for modest differences between central and
local governments with regard to ki .11 Grants are calculated for two different participation
constraints, TNBL = 0, which is non-binding, and TNBL = 175, where the latter is chosen
because it implies that the local government requires at least as high net benefits after dele-
gation as when the central government has the decision-right on wetlands. Thus, this reflects
a case where the local government has a high bargaining power, and only accepts delegation
if this leads to higher net benefits than when the central government decides on wetlands.
Results show that for small improvements in wetlands efficiency, kL = 2kC , the strategi-
cally optimal grants would both be around 0.3, even when there is no binding participation
constraint. Given that the participation constraint is not binding, the intuition is that the cen-
tral government chooses the grants to exploit the opportunity of getting large environmental
benefits at low (perceived) cost, which could for example be achieved by directing the grant
to abatement with slowly increasing marginal cost. For higher kL , β = 0 because WWTP
reductions are no longer included in the solution. With a binding participation constraint,
the central government meets this by simultaneously increasing all of the parameters α, β
(provided that WWTP reductions are included) and x1. The results indicate that the central
government strives to do this in a manner such that the net impact on the abatement decisions
by both decision-makers is kept small, implying that the net effect comes relatively close to
that of a lump-sum grant.
It may also be noted that the possibility to choose a strategically optimal grant is not
beneficial for society as a whole because it increases the strategic bias compared with the
socially optimal outcome and therefore, social net benefits are reduced. However, a binding
participation constraint seems to limit the strategic bias in the game when 4kC ≤ kL ≤ 6kC ,
as it sets limits on the central government’s use of its first-mover advantage and provides an
incentive to increase x1. Therefore, social net benefits are higher than when the constraint
is non-binding. For higher levels of kL the participation constraint is nonbinding and both
governments benefit from strategically chosen grants, as they provide environmental benefits
at a perceived low cost. This has, as expected, negative social effects.
7 Summary and Conclusions
This article develops a model of hierarchical governance in water management, that captures
several plausible characteristics of applicable the policy settings such as strategic delega-
tion, limited scope for delegation of decision-rights, interdependence between measures with
regard to the environmental effects, and strategic monetary transfers between governments
at different levels.
The analysis shows that if decisions are taken sequentially and the central government
moves first, i.e. there is a Stackelberg game, strategic consideration becomes an important
determinant of decisions of abatement and intergovernmental grants. It is shown that with
sequential decisions, the central government might undertake more abatement than socially
optimal if wetlands are highly efficient in nutrient abatement. With less efficient nutrient
abatement in wetlands, we have the more intuitive result that the central government will use
its strategic position to shift more of the abatement burden to the local government.
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The model is simulated based on Swedish data. The simulations show that with sequential
decisions where the central government explores its first mover advantage, both governments
may lose from delegation if they have identical wetland technology and costs and wetland
efficiency is low, because of the larger strategic bias in a game where wetland decisions
are delegated to the local level. This is explained by the interdependence between nitrogen
fertilizer reductions and wetlands being larger than the interdependence between wetlands
and phosphorus reductions at WWTPs.
The simulations also illustrate that net benefits to each governmental level are jointly deter-
mined by costs, environmental effects, and strategic bias in the game. The central government
will prefer delegation of decision-rights for wetlands already for low improvements in wet-
land abatement given its strategically advantageous position. The local government will be
worse off under delegation unless locally designed wetlands are considerably more efficient
than centrally designed, implying that strategic disadvantages are outweighed by higher tech-
nological efficiency. Two factors can dampen the central government’s possibilities to exploit
its strategically advantageous position: (i) larger independency of the local government; and
(ii) the local government having the decision-right over WWTP phosphorus management. A
larger independency, where the local government resists taking on additional decision rights
unless they are associated with an increase in net benefits, implies that the central govern-
ment must meet the local government’s participation constraint with a combination of larger
abatement efforts by the central government and higher intergovernmental grants for local
abatement. The fact that the local government has the decision-right on WWTP phosphorus
management implies that the central government is less inclined to make the local govern-
ment increase wetland construction because of the negative effects this will have on WWTP
phosphorus abatement. In most cases, these two factors will also reduce the negative social
consequences of strategic behavior in this game.
Finally, simulations illustrate that strategically chosen matching grants can serve two dif-
ferent purposes, one of reducing the perceived costs of abatement to the central government,
and one of satisfying the local government’s participation constraint. The results indicate that
the strategy for the choice of grants differs between the purposes. In the former case, grants
are directed to measures with slowly increasing marginal cost, thereby leading to larger devi-
ations from the socially optimal outcome. In the latter, grants are chosen such that the overall
impact on abatement decisions is kept low, thereby leading to only small deviations from
the socially optimal outcome. This suggests that grants with the purpose of satisfying a local
government’s participation constraint may have less negative consequences for society than
grants aiming at reducing the central government’s perceived costs of measures undertaken.
This paper investigates the outcome of a Stackelberg game. This is not to say that a Stac-
kelberg game is the only possible type of interaction between governmental levels, but other
forms of interaction, such as Cournot games, Nash bargaining, or repeated or cooperative
games could be relevant for modeling determination of environmental policy. The outcome
of such interaction remains to be investigated and results may differ from those presented
here. Moreover, the simulations here are a stylized representation of Swedish policy and
should be taken as an attempt to analyze how decisions are determined in a hierarchical
setting, rather than as a basis for suggesting policy changes. One limitation of the model
is that several factors, such as capacity for wetland construction at different locations, and
therefore with different nutrient abatement potential, is not included in the model. In addition,
as becomes clear in the analysis, the number of abatement activities and associated policy
decisions included in the model affects the outcome. There are additional options available
for improving water quality such as abatement at other emission sources and introduction of
alternative land uses which reduce nitrogen leaching.
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The article’s results offer better understanding of some of the mechanisms that govern the
environmental and economic consequences of partial delegation of environmentally inter-
linked policy measures. They explain some of the reluctance that local governments seem to
have against taking on additional responsibilities for environmental management and point
to some of the factors that dampen the negative effects of strategic behavior. Our results
also contribute to the understanding of why and how earmarked grants for environmental
purposes are paid to local governments in the absence of interregional spillovers. Although
the study is limited to dealing only with one particular land use measure—wetlands—the
results could carry over also to other land use measures in their role for water management
policies. The reason is that land is usually multifunctional, serving as a pollutant sink for
different kinds of pollutants, while the emission sources may be regulated at both central and
local levels.
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